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When the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed in the late
1980s, each state in the region was faced with the tasks of restoring judicial
independence and reforming its system of the administration of justice. The
European Commission teamed up with the Council of Europe and eventually
came up with a new template, the ‘Judicial Council Euro-model’.1 The central
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feature of this model was a new institution – a judicial council2 which was
supposed to be granted most powers regarding the careers of individual judges.3
This model was then endorsed in the accession process as the only ‘right’ solution
capable of eradicating the vices of the post-communist judiciaries.4 As a result of
this pressure, most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia,
adopted this ‘pan-European template’.5
Not Czechia. It became the ‘black sheep’ of the region and the only
post-communist EU Member State without a judicial council. Czechia thus became
an ‘outlier case’6, with its judiciary exhibiting a relatively high level of independence
from the executive, despite functioning within the Ministry of Justice model of court
administration, yet at the same time very limited internal independence. Such a
combination is puzzling. This article argues that the most important phenomenon
since the Velvet Revolution, which explains this puzzle, is the rise in power of court
presidents who play an intriguing twin role in ensuring judicial independence.
It shows that Czech court presidents have managed, step-by-step, to erode the
Minister’s sphere of influence and have themselves become the most powerful players
in the Czech judiciary, able to wield themost effective ‘stick’ (disciplinary motion) and
‘carrot’ (promotion) against individual judges. The Czech court presidents are thus
both protectors of judicial independence and simultaneously a threat to it. More
specifically, while court presidents have generally managed to gain independence from
the Ministry of Justice and increase judicial autonomy, some have also misused their
2 Judicial councils can be roughly defined as intermediary bodies between the political branches
and the judiciary that have advisory or decision-making powers mainly in the appointment,
promotion and discipline of judges. For a succinct categorisation of judicial councils seeN. Garoupa
and T. Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence’,
57 American Journal of Comparative Law (2009) p. 103.
3For the purposes of this article, the ‘Judicial Council Euro-model’ means a particular model
of judicial council which meets five criteria, namely: (1) it is entrenched in the Constitution; (2) it
ensures that judges have at least parity in it; (3) real decision-making power is vested in it; (4) most
competences regarding a judge’s career are transferred to it; and (5) the Chief Justice or his/her
equivalent is selected as its chairman (see Bobek and Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 1262-1264).
4See the literature in supra n. 1.
5See e.g. M. Popova, ‘Why the Bulgarian Judiciary Does Not Prosecute Corruption?’,
59 Problems of Post Communism (2012) p. 35 (on Bulgaria); A. Bodnar and L. Bojarski, ‘Judicial
Independence in Poland’, in Anja Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (Springer
2012) p. 667 (on Poland); R. Coman and C. Dallara, ‘Judicial Independence in Romania’,
in ibid. p. 835 (on Romania); Z. Fleck, ‘Judicial Independence in Hungary’, in ibid.
p. 793 (on Hungary); and D. Kosař, Perils of Judicial Self-Government (Cambridge University
Press 2016) p. 236-333 (on Slovakia).
6For more details on the ‘outlier case’ logic and on why outlier cases are particularly important
for theory-building research see R. Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative
Constitutional Law’, 53 American Journal of Comparative Law (2005) p. 125 at p. 146-152.
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newly-accrued powers against rank-and-file judges with the intent of keeping them
compliant and loyal. This article concludes that court presidents wield huge powers,
either directly or indirectly, also in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
and, thus, the problem of limited internal independence of judges from court
presidents permeates the entire region. Ultimately, it is impossible to understand
judicial politics in Central and Eastern Europe and to reform their judiciaries without
acknowledging the central role of court presidents.
The contribution of this article to the existing literature is two-fold. First, it shows
that the post-communist judiciary can achieve significant judicial autonomy even
without a judicial council. The Czech development suggests that court presidents may
de facto fulfil the tasks of the judicial council in preserving the independence of the
judiciary from political branches. In other words, several paths lead to judicial
autonomy, and a judicial council is just one of them. Second, greater judicial autonomy
is not in itself sufficient for achieving the independence of individual judges. While
Czech judges are relatively well shielded from external threats to their individual
independence coming from the executive and legislative branches, they are left
unprotected against internal threats from court presidents, and may become, de facto,
dependent on them. We must thus accept that the independence of the judiciary and
the independence of individual judges are two different things, and that increasing the
former does not automatically improve the latter. This forces us to rethink our strategies
aimed at increasing judicial independence and to acknowledge that judicial autonomy,
ensured by the judicial council or autonomous court presidents, is neither necessary nor
sufficient to achieve individual judicial independence. More specifically, this article
argues that we should pay more attention to the independence of individual judges
irrespective of the model of court administration in which they operate, because such a
strategy is more resistant to abusive constitutionalism.
This article proceeds as follows. First, it introduces the key players in Czech judicial
politics after the Velvet Revolution. Then it demonstrates how court presidents have
gradually managed to free themselves from the Minister of Justice, and analyses
the ensuing political backlash. Subsequently, it illustrates how the court presidents
managed to contain this backlash, which resulted in a fragile balance between court
presidents and theMinistry of Justice. Finally, it discusses the broader repercussions of
the Czech case study. It concludes that court presidents in other countries in the
region also wield huge powers, that the internal independence of judges from court
presidents must be increased, and that it is necessary to shift attention from the
independence of the judiciary to the independence of individual judges.
Setting the scene: key players in Czech judicial politics
To understand Czech judicial politics, it is necessary to identify its de facto
key players. As will be shown, it is not enough to rely on the Constitution and
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statutory law, as some of those players are rather informal bodies. Moreover,
written law does not tell us much about the real powers of, and mutual relations
between, formal organs.
In a nutshell, since the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the Czechoslovak
model of court administration, like those of other countries in Central Europe,7
always rested on two pillars: theMinistry of Justice and the court presidents.8 Even
the communist regimes relied heavily on these two actors.9 These two pillars did
not change after the division of Czechoslovakia, since Czechia has not established
a nation-wide judicial council.10 In addition to the Ministry of Justice and the
court presidents, six more actors intervene in Czech judicial politics: the Czech
President; the government; the Parliament; the Constitutional Court; the judicial
boards11 and the Judicial Union. This section will briefly sketch the role of these
eight players.
Czech court presidents have accumulated significant powers vis-à-vis individual
judges. They have the best overview of what is going on within the judiciary and
this information asymmetry works in their favour. Their big advantage is that they
remain in office much longer than the Ministers of Justice.12 They can make use
of the most important ‘stick’ available to civil law judiciaries (disciplinary motion),
play a major role in handing out the most important ‘carrot’ (promotion of
judges), and have an important say, together with the Minister of Justice, in the
7See e.g. S. Frankowski, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary in Poland: Reflections on Andrzej
Rzeplinski’s Sadownictwo w Polsce Ludowej (The Judiciary in Peoples’ Poland) (1989)’, 8 Arizona
Journal of International & Comparative Law (1991) p. 33 at p. 40–47; and I. Markovits, ‘Children of
a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist Germany’, 94Michigan Law Review (1996) p. 2270 at
p. 2292–2293.
8See M. Bobek, ‘The Administration of Courts in the Czech Republic – In Search of a
Constitutional Balance’, 16 European Public Law (2010) p. 251 at p. 252-254; and Z. Kühn, The
Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in Transformation? (Brill 2011)
p. 1-4 and 7–8.
9See e.g. A. Bröstl, ‘At the Crossroads on the Way to an Independent Slovak Judiciary’, in
J. Přibáň et al. (eds.), Systems of Justice in Transition: Central European Experiences since 1989
(Ashgate 2003) p. 141 at p. 143; and E. Wagnerová, ‘Position of Judges in the Czech Republic’,
in ibid., p. 163 at p. 167.
10Due to space constraints, this article cannot get into the details of why the 2000 constitutional
bill, which was intended to introduce the judicial council model of court administration in the Czech
Republic, was rejected by the Czech Parliament. For further details see Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 269;
and Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 182-185.
11A judicial board is a ‘self-governing’ judicial body created at every Czech court that consists
exclusively of regular judges of a given court. Court presidents and vice-presidents cannot sit on
judicial boards.
12Note that Czech court presidents were appointed for life (until September 2008) and then for a
term of 7 to 10 years (since October 2008). In contrast, the average length of the term of the Czech
Minister of Justice since 1993 has been less than two years; see also infra n. 59.
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secondment of judges. Moreover, they also completely control several small-
scale13 mechanisms which usually escape scholarly attention, such as case
assignment, the reassignment of judges among the panels, and the selection of
judges for grand chambers at top courts. These mechanisms may at first seem
marginal, but they have tremendous consequences in the long run for the judges
affected. Moreover, court presidents gradually became gatekeepers to the
judiciary, as it is they, and not the Minister of Justice, who hand-pick new
judges.14 Finally, it is important to stress that court presidents play a dual role
within the Czech judiciary: they act as both managers vested with the above-
mentioned administrative tasks and as judges who decide cases like any other
judge.15 Court presidents can thus exploit this ‘functional schizophrenia’ and
portray any action against them by the executive as not only taking aim at their
administrative function, but as an attack on their judicial function.16
However, court presidents as a group do not comprise a uniform body.
Two important informal bodies within the ranks of court presidents have
gradually emerged: the college of presidents of regional courts and the trinity of
top court presidents. The ‘college of presidents of regional courts’ is an informal
group that consists of the presidents of all eight regional courts. They usually meet
four times a year to discuss current issues within the judiciary.17 Regional court
presidents decided to create the college in 200118 for two reasons: to discuss
practical issues that affected all regional courts, and from a sense that they had to
take the lead in judicial reform.19 Initially, the college focused on the former, but it
soon shifted its attention to the latter. Even though the college has no statutory
underpinning20 and operates on a purely informal basis, it is an influential body
in Czech judicial politics. Minutes from its meetings are sent to and regularly
13On the importance of such small-scale mechanisms in general see A. Vermeule, Judicial
Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small (Oxford University Press 2007).
14See Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 188-191 and 215-216.
15 In most civil law systems, court presidents have a reduced case load due to their numerous
administrative tasks.
16 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
17 Interview with a former president of a regional court (who was one of the co-founders of the
college) of 6 May 2015.
18According to one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the college, the idea of creating an informal
association of regional court presidents was suggested to them by Mr Jean-Michel Peltier, a French
liaison magistrate in Prague (ibid.).
19 Interview with a former president of a regional court (who was one of the co-founders of the
college) of 6 May 2015.
20Note that in 2007 presidents of regional courts attempted to formalise the college and entrench
it into the Law on Courts and Judges. However, both the Minister of Justice and the presidents of
the top courts rejected that idea, and the relevant amendment to the Law on Courts and Judges was
not adopted (ibid.).
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discussed within the Ministry of Justice.21 The key media take the college’s
position seriously as well.
More recently, the presidents of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Administrative Court have created an informal ‘trinity of top
court presidents’.22 The presidents of these three top courts, each in his or her way,
have always exercised their influence on the Czech judiciary. However, they only
formed a truly cohesive group in 2015. This was prompted by the resignation of
the then Supreme Court President Iva Brožová23 in January 2015,24 to be
eventually replaced by Pavel Šámal. Šámal soon found common ground with the
President of the Constitutional Court, Pavel Rychetský, and, in particular, with
the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Josef Baxa.25
The Ministry of Justice is the second key player. It has historically played the
most important role in court administration and in holding judges to account. The
interwar Czechoslovak judiciary, based on the Austrian bureaucratic model,26 was
strictly hierarchical27 with the Minister of Justice at its apex. During the
communist era, the Ministry of Justice became the transmission belt28 of the
Communist Party and the Minister of Justice was himself subject to supervision
by the General Prosecutor.29 However, after the Velvet Revolution Czechia soon
21For further details on the emergence of the college of presidents of regional courts see Kosař,
supra n. 5, p. 179-180.
22This term has not been coined in Czech. Nevertheless, policy makers as well as journalists often
speak of the consensus among the ‘trojice’ of the court presidents of the Czech top courts.
23This was in fact a strategic resignation as her successor was agreed upon beforehand.
24Note that Iva Brožová was often out of sync with Pavel Rychetský and Josef Baxa.
25Pavel Rychetský and Josef Baxa have known each other well since the late 1990s as Josef Baxa
was a Vice-Minister of Justice in the Government of Miloš Zeman (1998-2002), whose Vice-PM
was Pavel Rychetský.
26See Kühn, supra n. 8, p. 1-4 and 7–8; and Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 252-253.
27On the distinction of the hierarchical and coordinate ideal of authority see M. Damaška, The
Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (Yale University Press
1986) p. 16-46 and 181-239.
28The ‘transmission belt’metaphor suggests that the Czechoslovak court presidents, who could be
recalled by the Communist Party anytime at a whim, were the conduit of the Communist Party
influence over individual judges. The main role of the court presidents was thus to ‘transmit’ orders
from the Communist Party to individual judges in sensitive cases. For the discussion of the
‘transmission belt’ argument in the Czech Republic after the Velvet Revolution, see infra n. 53.
29Note that under the Soviet model of prokuratura the General Prosecutor was the main guardian
of the socialist legality who, apart from vast powers in civil and criminal trials, was also responsible
for the court administration and supervising judges. See Art. 6 of Constitutional Law No. 64/1952
Col., on Courts and Procuracy; Wagnerová, supra n. 9, p. 167; and Kühn, supra n. 8, p. 43-45 and
61-62 (all regarding the communist Czechoslovakia). On the Soviet prokuratura more generally,
see e.g. G. Smith, The Soviet Procuracy and the Supervision of Administration (Springer 1978) and
J. Hazard, Communists and Their Law (University of Chicago Press 1969).
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returned to the interwar model and vested significant powers in the Ministry of
Justice. The Minister of Justice de jure nominates candidates for judicial office to
the President,30 but due to high turnover and information asymmetry most
ministers have outsourced the actual selection of new judges to court presidents.31
The Minister of Justice can also initiate disciplinary motions, but again due to
information asymmetry he has, in practice, not wielded this stick as often as
court presidents have. In addition, the Minister de jure proffers the most tempting
carrot (promotion of individual judges) and has a final say regarding the
secondment of judges, but court presidents have de facto taken control of these
mechanisms as well.
The President of the Czech Republic also has his say in Czech judicial politics as
he de jure wields wide powers as regards the judiciary. According to the Czech
Constitution, he appoints all judges of the ordinary courts, appoints the presidents
and vice-presidents of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court32
and, upon approval by the Senate, appoints all judges of the Constitutional
Court.33 Thus, he de jure exercises a significant influence over both ordinary courts
and the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Administrative Court and the
Constitutional Court eventually curtailed the President’s discretion in appointing
judges of the ordinary courts34 and in dismissing the court presidents of apex
courts,35 but the extent of the President’s discretion in selecting court presidents
and vice-presidents of top courts36 remains unclear.37
30Since the late 1990s a new constitutional convention has emerged. The Minister of Justice first
presents the list of candidates to the Government, which votes on the list and then submits it to
the Czech President who formally appoints the judges (Art. 63(1)(i) of the Czech Constitution).
31See supra n. 14.
32See Art. 62(f) of the Czech Constitution.
33See Art. 84(2) of the Czech Constitution.
34Due to space restrictions, it is not possible to discuss this line of case law in detail here. In a
nutshell, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the President of the Czech Republic had to
either appoint a judge nominated by the Government or issue an administrative decision that
provides reasons for not appointing a given judge. This administrative decision is then, according to
the Supreme Administrative Court, reviewable by administrative courts (see Judgment of the Czech
Supreme Administrative Court of 21 May 2008, No. 4 Ans 9/2007-197). However, the then Czech
President, Václav Klaus, refused to implement this judgment and never issued such a decision. As a
result, the scope of administrative review in such cases is unclear. For further details see Bobek, supra
n. 8, p. 260-263.
35See Judgments of the Czech Constitutional Court of 11 July 2006, case no. Pl. ÚS 18/06;
of 12 December 2006, case no. Pl. ÚS 17/06; of 12 September 2007, case no. Pl. ÚS 87/06,
§§ 40-41 and 70; and of 6 October 2010, case no. Pl. ÚS 39/08, §§ 62-69. All of these judgments
are discussed in more detail below.
36Since 2008 the President has also appointed presidents of high courts and regional courts,
in both cases upon nomination by the Minister of Justice.
37See Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 260-263.
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In contrast to the Minister of Justice and the President, the Czech government
has very few powers regarding the judiciary. Its one real power allows it to approve
the list of candidates for judicial office as drafted by the Minister of Justice before
the list is submitted to the President, who then formally appoints all judges
in the Czech Republic.38 In practice, the government has only rarely intervened in
the Minister’s list. As a result, the Government as a collegiate organ has so far not
played a significant role in the judicial career matters.
The Czech Parliament has even less power regarding the careers of ordinary
judges.39 It does not play any role in their selection, promotion or disciplining.
Hence, the Parliament’s options for intervention in daily judicial politics are
extremely limited. However, the Parliament holds the law-making power and may
amend the Law on Courts and Judges and other laws affecting the status of courts
and judges. As will be shown below, such statutory amendments may significantly
reshuffle the cards in Czech judicial politics. The Czech Parliament may also
ultimately amend the Czech Constitution, but it has not resorted to a wide-scale40
constitutional reform of the judiciary so far.41
The Czech Constitutional Court, based upon the German centralised model
of constitutional adjudication,42 is another important player. It is a powerful
institution that is not shy of striking down constitutional amendments43 and even
of openly clashing with the European Court of Justice.44 The fragmented political
scene in Czechia makes the Constitutional Court even stronger. The interferences
of the Constitutional Court in ‘judicial design issues’ are so numerous that it is
38See supra n. 30.
39Note that the Czech Parliament plays a key role in staffing the Czech Constitutional Court, as
its upper chamber, the Senate, confirms all Justices of the Czech Constitutional Court (by simple
majority) upon the nomination of the President of the Czech Republic (see supra n. 33).
40All changes to Chapter Four (the Judicial Branch) of the Czech Constitution adopted since
1993 have been rather cosmetic in nature.
41Note that the only attempt to change the large-scale structure of the Czech judiciary, the 2000
constitutional Bill which was supposed to introduce the judicial council, was rejected by the Czech
Parliament in 2000. See also supra n. 10.
42D. Kosař, ‘Conflicts between Fundamental Rights in the Jurisprudence of the Czech
Constitutional Court’, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2008)
p. 347 at p. 348–351. For a broader comparative context seeW. Sadurski, Rights before Courts: A Study
of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer 2014) p. 13-27
and 91-117.
43See Y. Roznai, ‘Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the
Czech Constitutional Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act’, 8 Vienna Journal
on International Constitutional Law (2014) p. 29.
44See R. Zbíral, ‘A Legal revolution or negligible episode? Court of Justice decision proclaimed
ultra vires (Czech Constitutional Court, judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12)’, 49 CMLR
(2012) p. 1475; and M. Bobek, ‘Landtová, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court:
Implications for the Preliminary Rulings Procedure’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 54.
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impossible to deal with them here.45 Virtually any ‘judicial design issue’ ends up
before the Constitutional Court and that Court has adopted the most stringent
level of judicial review in these matters.46
Judicial boards47 were established at all Czech courts in 2002.48 They have a
statutory basis and comment primarily on the promotion and secondment of
judges to a given court, on the division of the court’s case load and on the system
of case assignment.49 Judicial boards are ‘self-governing’ bodies as they consist of
judges of a given court, but their powers are only advisory and court presidents are
not bound by their advice.50 In sum, the powers of judicial boards are narrow and
limited to a particular court. These boards thus should not be confused with a
country-wide judicial council.51
Finally, the Judicial Union is a professional association of judges which was
established in 1990. The Judicial Union claims that it represents approximately
one third of Czech judges, most of whom come from lower courts.52 The main
goals of the Judicial Union include protecting judicial independence, participating
in the continuous education of judges, representing the interests of the judiciary,
contributing to the democratic legal order, promoting modern models of court
administration and cooperation with similar bodies abroad. The Judicial Union
has been particularly vocal in promoting the judicial council model of court
administration and its members have taken a leading role in challenging judicial
reforms before the Constitutional Court.
These eight institutional players interact in many ways. Sometimes they
cooperate, sometimes they fight each other. Their powers are not static. Their
strength has been tested in many political battles and influenced by judgments of
the Constitutional Court as well as by statutory amendments. As a result, the role
45For a snapshot of these interventions see Bobek, supra n. 8.
46See ibid.
47Given the nature and composition of these bodies, the more appropriate translation into
English would be ‘judicial assemblies’, but all materials on the Czech judiciary in English, including
the accession reports of the European Union, use the term ‘judicial board’. Hence, in order to avoid
confusion, this article will also refer to these bodies as ‘judicial boards’.
48Small district courts are an exception, as there is no judicial board at district courts with fewer
than 11 judges. Instead, the plenary session consisting of all the judges fulfils the tasks of a judicial
board. For further details see Arts. 46-59 of Law no. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.
49Arts. 50-53 of Law No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges.
50The central position of court presidents is further buttressed by the fact that they set the agenda
for judicial board meetings.
51This mistake was made even by the European Commission. See the 2002 Accession Progress
Report on the Czech Republic, p. 22: ‘The … [2002 Law on Courts and Judges] introduced a first
step towards self-government of the judiciary by the creation of Judicial Councils which have the
status of consultative bodies at all court levels’ (emphasis added).
52 I am grateful to the President of the Judicial Union, Daniela Zemanová, for this information.
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of each of these players has waxed and waned. Nevertheless, all anecdotes left
aside, one can easily see the major trajectory of the Czech politics of judicial
independence and judicial accountability. This trajectory will be sketched out in
the two sections that follow.
Gradual emancipation of court presidents from the executive and
the subsequent Backlash
The key players in Czech judicial politics are the Minister of Justice and court
presidents, since they, acting together, control most mechanisms of judicial
independence and judicial accountability. It is thus crucial to understand the
relationship between these two actors. It would seem that, if theMinister of Justice
can appoint court presidents and then dismiss them at will, he could then easily
induce them to comply with his wishes. In the most extreme situation, court
presidents could even operate as ‘transmission belts’ for the executive.
The ‘transmission belt’ argument goes as follows. Until the mid-2000s, Czech
Ministers of Justice53 could, de jure, dismiss court presidents without providing any
reason. Thus, rank-and-file judges held to account by court presidents were indirectly
held to account by the Minister of Justice, since Ministers of Justice de jure decided
on who would be named court president. Thus, as the ‘transmission belt’ argument
suggests, court presidents were the conduit of executive influence over individual
judges. That would mean that the main role of court presidents, comparable to the
communist era,54 was to ‘transmit’ orders to individual judges in sensitive cases.
However, this ‘transmission belt’ argument does not work in Czechia. Even
though the 1991 and 2002 laws on courts and judges gave the Minister of Justice
the power to dismiss court presidents of the district, regional and high courts,
he used his power rarely. Why? First, the political costs of dismissing court
presidents became extremely high. Most ministers desperately wanted to avoid this
type of confrontation, which would hand the opposition parties the proverbial
stick with which to beat the Minister and the ruling coalition. In the 1990s some
Ministers dared to take the risk. For instance, when Otakar Motejl became the
Minister of Justice in 1998, he soon dismissed five of the eight regional court
presidents.55 However, Motejl’s gravitas was rather unique. He was himself the
53Note that the ‘transmission belt’ argument has a different twist regarding the apex courts, where
it was the Czech President (and not the Minister of Justice) who could, de jure, recall the presidents
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. However, the logic remains the same.
54However, there was one difference: court presidents were supposed to follow the orders of the
executive and not the Communist Party. On the role of court presidents during the communist
Czechoslovakia, see supra n. 28.
55See J. Kolomazníková and L. Navara, ‘Pravým důvodem odvolání soudců je zřejmě jejich
minulost’, IDnes.cz, 17 March 1999.
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former Supreme Court President, and thus his actions had the necessary veneer of
legitimacy. Yet even Otakar Motejl, whose stature and reputation were
unquestionable, faced severe criticism from the new Supreme Court president
Eliška Wagnerová, the remaining lower court presidents, and the media for this
move. Moreover, the court presidents, who felt threatened by the active use of this
power by the Ministers of Justice, eventually fought back and fiercely attacked
Motejl’s ultimately unsuccessful proposal for a High Council of the Judiciary.56 In
the early 2000s, while subsequent Ministers of Justice also occasionally resorted to
the dismissal of court presidents, none of them did so on as large scale as Motejl.
In 2006 the Czech Constitutional Court put an end to the practice altogether.57
Second, the ministers actually needed court presidents in order to conduct
meaningful policy and to make well-informed decisions on promotions and other
personnel matters. There are no individualised judicial statistics and no
performance evaluations of individual judges, and virtually no judgments of the
lower courts were published.58 The high turnover of ministers of justice further
tipped the balance. There were 16 ministers of justice between 1993 and 2015 and
the average length of their term was less than two years.59 In contrast, most court
presidents held office for more than a decade. Due to this information asymmetry,
the ministers simply had to rely on the judgment of the incumbent regional court
presidents who had hands-on daily experience with individual judges and who had
held office for many years or even decades.60 As a result, they started to treat the
presidents of regional courts like partners.61 Pavel Rychetský, the Vice-Prime
Minister (1998-2003) and the Minister of Justice (2002-2003), put it frankly.
When asked ‘What is the personal politics of a minister of justice?’ he replied
‘The one that fulfils the wishes of the regional court presidents’.62
56For the reasons of this failure see Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 256; and Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 182-185.
57See infra nn. 63-71.
58The access to decisions of the Czech lower courts improved significantly in the late 2000s,
but not all are available.
59The term of the current Minister of Justice, Robert Pelikán, who has held the office since
March 2015 is not taken into account. See also supra n. 12.
60That explains whyMinisters of Justice needed particular court presidents. i.e. those who already
held the office (incumbents), and could not replace the sitting court presidents easily. In other words,
the sitting court presidents were well embedded and regarded in the system, and thus it was difficult
to dismiss them.
61Note that Jiří Pospíšil held the office of the Minister of Justice twice (2006-2009 and 2010-
2012) and thus he is counted twice.
62P. Rychetský, ‘Pohled ministrů spravedlnosti’ in J. Kysela (ed.), Hledání optimálního modelu
správy soudnictví pro Českou republiku Searching for the Optimal Model of Czech Court Administration
(Senát ČR 2008) p. 20 at p. 22. The contributions of other three ministers of justice –Otakar Motejl
(1998-2000), Karel Čermák (2003-2004) and Jiří Pospíšil (2006-2009 and 2010-2012) – confirm
Rychetský’s view (see ibid. at p. 15, 18, and 28-31).
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However, that was not the end of the emancipation process. A few years later,
Czech court presidents started to challenge their dismissals before administrative
courts and the Constitutional Court, and eventually won.63 In 2005 the Prague
Municipal Court annulled the decision of the Minister of Justice to remove the
President of the District Court for Prague-West on the ground that it was not
sufficiently reasoned.64 Less than year later, the Czech President, Václav Klaus,
dismissed Iva Brožová from the position of President of the Supreme Court65 with a
terse letter that did not state any reasons for her dismissal, and appointed Jaroslav
Bureš to the post instead. It was the first time the Czech President had ever dared to do
so. Iva Brožová immediately challenged her dismissal before the Constitutional Court,
and she also won. The Constitutional Court based its judgment on the principles of
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. It struck down Article
106 of the Czech Law on Courts and Judges, declaring that it was unconstitutional for
the executive to dismiss the presidents and vice presidents of courts.66 Subsequently,
the Constitutional Court also annulled the very assignment of Jaroslav Bureš to the
Supreme Court (as a regular Supreme Court judge),67 since the appointment was
made without the consent of the President of the Supreme Court (Iva Brožová),68 and
voided his subsequent appointment to the position of Vice-President of the Supreme
Court.69 Iva Brožová thus not only managed to keep her position as President of the
Supreme Court,70 but also blocked the appointment of Jaroslav Bureš to any position
at the Supreme Court.71
63For further details including more doctrinal analysis of these cases see Bobek, supra n. 8,
p. 263–265.
64 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague (Administrative Division) of 24 July 2005, Case 5
Ca 37/2005-42.
65Note that Brožová was stripped ‘only’ of the position of court president. She was not dismissed
from judicial office and thus she still remained a judge of the Supreme Court.
66 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 11 July 2006, case no. Pl. ÚS 18/06.
67 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 12 December 2006, case no. Pl. ÚS 17/06.
68This consent is required by Art. 70 of Law on Courts and Judges, but the Czech Constitution
does not contain such rule and merely stipulates that the Czech President appoints judges
(Art. 63(1)(i) of the Czech Constitution).
69See Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 12 September 2007, case no. Pl. ÚS 87/06,
§§ 40-41 and 70.
70However, her conflicts with politicians did not fade away. After the unsuccessful dismissal of
Brožová in 2006 by the President Václav Klaus the Czech Parliament attempted to shorten her term
of office as Supreme Court President via the statutory amendment in 2008. Nevertheless, this
statutory amendment was again quashed by the Constitutional Court in 2010 (see Judgment of the
Czech Constitutional Court of 6 October 2010, case no. Pl. ÚS 39/08, § 68). So Brožová won yet
again. But she became increasingly tired of the constant battles with politicians and eventually
resorted to a strategic resignation in 2015 (see also supra n. 23).
71 Jaroslav Bureš eventually became the Vice-President of the High Court of Prague. For further
details see Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 173-175.
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As a result of the Brožová cases, the dismissal of court presidents became
unconstitutional. This significantly altered the constitutional balance between the
executive and the judiciary. The emancipation of Czech court presidents seemed to
have reached its final stage, since after the rulings of the Constitutional Court the
Ministers of Justice had very few means to force them to cooperate.72
However, this triumph for court presidents did not last long. The emancipation
of the court presidents from theMinistry of Justice and their major victories before
the Constitutional Court did not escape the attention of Czech politicians. Even
the Constitutional Court Justices realised that they had stretched the Czech
Constitution to its very limits in the Brožová cases.
Court presidents thus soon witnessed a backlash. A first and unexpected blow
came from the Czech Parliament, which reacted to the Constitutional Court
rulings prohibiting the dismissal of court presidents by introducing limited terms
for all court presidents.73 Until 2008, court presidents were appointed by the
Minister of Justice for an indefinite period. The only exception applied to court
presidents of the two highest courts, the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court, who also enjoyed an indefinite term, but were appointed
by the Czech President.74 The 2008 Amendment to the Law on Courts and Judges
put an end to indefinite terms for all court presidents.75 Since 2009, court
presidents of district courts, regional courts and high courts have been appointed
for seven year terms,76 whereas the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Administrative Court are appointed for a term of ten years.77 During this
term, which was originally renewable once, court presidents can be removed only
by a disciplinary panel. This means that the Minister of Justice and the President
lost their power to dismiss court presidents. Therefore, the 2008 Amendment to
the Law on Courts and Judges in fact did two things. It introduced term limits
72This is in stark contrast with the post-Soviet judiciaries. On the latter see e.g. A. Ledeneva,
‘From Russia with Blat: Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia?, 76 Social Research (2009)
p. 257 at p. 276 and M. Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in
Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge University Press 2012) p. 139-145.
73The same limited terms also apply to vice-presidents. However, vice-presidents are vested with
only limited competences and hence this article focuses primarily on court presidents, who wield
real power.
74The same procedure applies to the Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court.
75Note that the 2008 Amendment to the Law on Courts and Judges (Law No. 314/2008 Coll.,
amending Law on Courts and Judges) introduced the same limited terms also for vice-presidents.
See also Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 263-265.
76See Arts. 103(2), 104(2), 105(2) and 106(2) of Law on Courts and Judges.
77See Art. 102(2) of Law on Courts and Judges; and Art. 13(3) of Law No. 150/2002 Coll.,
the Code of Administrative Justice.
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for court presidents and at the same time guaranteed them security of tenure. This
was a true paradigm shift.
The introduction of limited terms for court presidents caused an outcry among
then incumbent court presidents, whose position had been challenged for the first
time since the independence of Czechia. Some court presidents realised that they
would have to become rank-and-file judges again at some point down the road.
A group of senators eventually echoed their concerns and challenged this part of
the 2008 Amendment before the Constitutional Court.
However, there came another blow, which was even more unanticipated.
To the surprise of many court presidents, the Constitutional Court sided with the
politicians regarding the introduction of limited terms for court presidents. In fact,
it even increased the turnover among court presidents. It not only found that the
introduction of limited terms for court presidents 78 and the application of the
limited terms to the incumbent court presidents79 were constitutional, it also
struck down, for fear of potential personal corruption of sitting court presidents
seeking re-appointment, the provision that allowed the re-appointment of the
same court president for a second term.80 By adopting this unexpected position
the Constitutional Court de facto ordered a complete overhaul of the Czech
judicial leadership as all presidents and vice-presidents of Czech ordinary courts
were required to leave their posts by 2018 at the latest. Court presidents of
86 district courts, 8 regional courts and 2 high courts had to do so by September
2015,81 the two court presidents of the Supreme Court and Supreme
Administrative Court by September 2018.82 By now, all then-incumbent court
presidents except for the President of the Supreme Administrative Court83 are
gone,84 which is the most important change within the Czech judiciary since the
Velvet Revolution.
The third blow came from the Minister of Justice, Jiří Pospíšil, who served his
second term as the minister between 2010 and 2012. He attempted to rebalance
the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and court presidents and, to this
78 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 6 October 2010, case no. Pl. ÚS 39/08,
§§ 62-64.
79 Ibid., §§ 67-69.
80 Ibid., §§ 65-66.
81That is within seven years from October 2008, when the 2008 Amendment to the Law on
Courts and Judges entered into force. See supra n. 76.
82That is within 10 years from October 2008, when the 2008 Amendment to the Law on Courts
and Judges entered into force. See supra n. 77.
83Note that the incumbent President of the Supreme Court, Iva Brožová, resigned voluntarily in
January 2015. See supra n. 24.
84The situation regarding the vice-presidents is slightly different. For the sake of brevity, this issue
is not addressed here.
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end, in 2012 prepared a new Bill which was supposed to amend the Law on
Courts and Judges. Even though Jiří Pospíšil eventually failed and his 2012 Bill
was not adopted,85 it was an important milestone in the bargaining game between
the Minister of Justice and court presidents. This Bill intended, among other
things,86 to change the mode of selection of judges and court presidents. More
specifically, it proposed the creation of mixed commissions, composed of both
members of the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, who would select new judges
as well as new court presidents. This move was perceived by court presidents as an
attempt to strengthen the position of the Minister of Justice, since prior to this Bill
new judges were de facto selected by regional court presidents alone and new court
presidents were agreed upon behind closed doors.87 Understandably, court
presidents vigorously opposed this change. Jiří Pospíšil, in turn, increased the
tension by freezing all judicial nominations until the new mode of selection of
judges was agreed upon and the 2012 Bill had passed. By freezing all judicial
nominations Pospíšil wanted to show raw power and force court presidents to
accept his Bill.
Towards a fragile balance between the Ministry of Justice and
court presidents
It took court presidents several years to recover from these three blows and to
contain the backlash which endangered their privileged position. Regarding the
third blow, court presidents got lucky as Jiří Pospíšil was dismissed as Minister of
Justice in June 2012 before he could present the 2012 Bill in Parliament. The new
minister of justice, Pavel Blažek, had less radical views regarding judicial reform,
wanted to maintain a friendlier relationship with court presidents, and thus
scrapped the 2012 Bill.88 That means that the selection of judges did not change
at all and that court presidents had thus preserved their power. Similarly, the
selection process for new court presidents was not explicitly introduced in the Law
on Courts and Judges. As a result, each Minister of Justice adopted his own
selection method, which again de facto preserved the status quo.
85See the next part of this article.
86The 2012 Bill also intended to introduce judicial performance evaluation and financial
declarations of judges. Both of these tools would give the Ministry of Justice the necessary
information to counter the existing information asymmetry (which worked, until then, in favour of
court presidents) and to make more informed decisions regarding the promotion of judges. These
two tools would thus also work to the disadvantage of court presidents, who would lose their
competitive edge.
87See supra n. 14.
88See J. Hardoš, ‘ Blažek odložil zavedení výběrových řízení na nové soudce’Blažek put the
competitive selection procedure for new judges on the shelf, Právo, 2 August 2012, p. 4.
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It has proved more difficult to repair the perceived damage caused by the
2008 Amendment and the subsequent ruling by the Constitutional Court.
Nevertheless, the court presidents still managed to deflect these two blows to their
status and powers. But before we explain the techniques employed by Czech court
presidents, we need to explain why they felt so threatened by the introduction of a
non-renewable limited term and fought back to dismantle it. Their motivation was
two-fold.89 First, they wanted to preserve their influence within the judiciary.
Second, they wanted to keep additional privileges attached to the office of court
president such as a significant salary increase, reduced case load, wide secretarial
support and extra law clerks. In fact, some long-serving court presidents were no
longer able to operate without these privileges. They could not imagine themselves
shouldering a normal case load (in terms of both quantity and composition) with
the aid of fewer law clerks. They were no longer judges in the true sense. It is this
dual rationale that explains why they were challenging a non-renewable limited
term so vigorously.
So, how did court presidents contain the perceived damage caused by the 2008
Amendment and the subsequent ruling of the Constitutional Court? Soon after
the Constitutional Court ruled to prohibit renewable terms for court presidents,
the court presidents of lower courts started to forge informal alliances with the
presidents of higher courts in order to secure their positions after the expiration of
their current terms. Whether out of professional courtesy for their fellows or for
other reasons, many presidents of regional courts were willing to fill the vacancies
at their courts with lame duck district court presidents. Likewise, the presidents of
high courts started providing the same ‘shelter’ to regional court presidents whose
mandate had expired. Some of those promoted incumbent lower court presidents
soon became the vice-presidents or presidents of the higher courts to which they
were promoted.90
However, the number of vacancies at higher courts is limited, and not
all of them could be filled by ousted lower court presidents. Therefore, court
presidents had to devise other strategies. Initially, they came up with the argument
that having the court president and vice-president of a given court merely
switch positions would satisfy the requirements of the Constitutional Court
ruling, even though it defied the logic of the argument of the Constitutional
Court that wanted to prevent the dependence of court presidents on the
politicians (the Minister of Justice and the Czech President) who appoint them.
89See also Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 403 (describing how the same two-fold motivation ‘forced’ Slovak
court presidents to fight back against the introduction of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic
and explaining why Slovak court presidents eventually captured the Judicial Council of the Slovak
Republic).
90See L. Derka, ‘Pro soudní funkcionáře právo neplatí?’, 4 Soudce (2015) p. 7.
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Later on, some court presidents ‘temporarily’ authorised the incumbent
vice-president to govern his or her court section even after the mandate
of the incumbent vice-president had expired. By doing so, these court presidents
bypassed the approval of the Minister of Justice (which was necessary for a
formal appointment of a new vice-president) and managed to de facto defy the
non-renewability of the term of vice-presidents. Finally, court presidents
started openly defying the Constitutional Court ruling by nominating
incumbent vice-presidents for a second successive term. They eventually
succeeded, as some weak Ministers of Justice wanted to avoid quarrels with
judicial leadership and eventually approved these nominations.91 These
appointments stand, as no one is willing to challenge them. In truth, although
some of the above-mentioned techniques required ‘mutual cooperation’ between
the given court president and the Minister of Justice (and hence both were
complicit in defying the Constitutional Court ruling),92 all of these actions were
invented and pushed through by court presidents who had managed to ‘corner’
the weak Ministers of Justice.93
All of these techniques in turn opened a crack in the implementation
of the Constitutional Court ruling. Several court presidents had already suggested
that, despite its clear wording, this ruling did not prevent the reappointment of
incumbent court presidents.94 The court presidents and vice-presidents involved
also suggested by their actions that they did not feel bound by the judgments of
the Constitutional Court, which sent a bad signal to Czech society.95 The silence96
of other key actors within the judiciary – the Judicial Union, the college of regional
court presidents and the trinity of the top court presidents – further undermined
the Constitutional Court ruling. This solidarity between court presidents across
different tiers of the Czech judiciary also had another deleterious side-effect.
It conveyed the message to regular judges that it is futile to compete with
an incumbent or a former court president for a position of court president
or vice-president or for promotion to a higher court as there is no chance of
winning anyway. As a result, several great candidates from among the regular
91 Ibid.
92 I am grateful for this insight to an anonymous reviewer.
93For instance, some court presidents used their informal powers and made sure that only the
incumbent vice-president responded to the call for a new vice-president. This left the Minister of
Justice in a difficult position, as he or she did not have anyone else to choose from, and issuing a new
call would leave the position of the vice-president vacant for a long time (without the guarantee that
more candidates would participate in the second call).
94Supra, n. 90.
95 Ibid.
96This does not mean that these actors ignore or defy the Constitutional Court ruling. Many of
them actually respect the ruling, but they do not want to openly criticise their colleagues.
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judges have not applied.97 In the worst-case scenario, various ‘clans’, not unlike
correnti within the Italian judiciary,98 could emerge99 within the Czech judiciary.
Yet, despite the above-mentioned efforts of court presidents to contain the
backlash, they have not managed to avoid the consequences of the 2008
Amendment and the subsequent Constitutional Court ruling completely. The
relationship between the Minister of Justice and court presidents has thus reached
a new stage that can be characterised as a fragile balance. This means three things.
First, court presidents have started to unite across hierarchical layers and across
branches of the Czech judiciary to create greater leverage vis-à-vis the Minister of
Justice. District court presidents cooperate with regional court presidents, regional
court presidents team up with high court presidents, and the presidents of the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court
have established the informal ‘trinity of top courts presidents’100 to coordinate
their actions. Second, both the Minister of Justice and court presidents try to
exploit their powers fully while waiting for the other side to make mistakes.
In other words, the weaker the Minister of Justice, the stronger the court
presidents, and vice versa.
Third, a side-effect of this continuing struggle is the increasing public scrutiny
of the actions taken by the Ministry of Justice and court presidents. Before the
Brožová cases the Ministry of Justice as well as court presidents enjoyed great
leeway, due to limited public scrutiny of the actions of the Minister of Justice and
limited knowledge of the real powers of court presidents. However, the proverbial
‘veil of ignorance’ has been lifted. Any skirmish between the Minister of Justice
and court presidents is subject to intense media scrutiny, the powers and influence
of the college of presidents of the regional courts and the trinity of top court
presidents have become common knowledge, and the appointment of any
president or vice-president from the level of the regional court upward is widely
discussed.
These three novelties – open conflicts between the Ministers of Justice and court
presidents, greater unity among court presidents, and increased public scrutiny –may
have important consequences, but the results are difficult to predict. What is clear,
though, is that Czech judicial politics has entered a new era characterised by a fragile
balance and bargaining between court presidents and the Ministry of Justice, in the
shadow of the law. This bargaining in the shadow of the law can itself be characterised
97 In fact, usually there is only one candidate, which: (1) makes the competition meaningless;
and (2) reduces the power of the President and the Minister of Justice (who formally appoint court
presidents and vice-presidents) as they cannot choose from several candidates. See also supra n. 93.
98See C. Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Europe: Threat or Resource for Democracy?’,
49 Representation (2013) p. 347 at p. 348.
99Some Czech court presidents admit that such clans already exist.
100See supra n. 22.
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as a repeated game played between the two key players in Czech day-to-day judicial
politics, the Minister of Justice and court presidents, against a backdrop of vague
constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the judiciary.101 These two players
engage in bargaining which consists of an exchange of demands and offers to divide
up the power of the Czech judiciary. If the demands of one player do not exceed the
offers of the other player, they reach settlement. However, when they do not, court
presidents go to the Constitutional Court and administrative courts, whereas the
Minister of Justice initiates (or threatens to initiate102) legislative change. These
moves result in a period of uncertainty as both Parliament and the Constitutional
Court, each in its own way, may change the laws governing the judiciary and
reshuffle the cards in the Czech judicial politics. Once the cards are reshuffled, the
Minister of Justice and court presidents again start bargaining, now against a
backdrop of the revised law.
Broader repercussions: the critical importance of internal
independence of individual judges
The Czech case study provides three important insights that are relevant far
beyond Czechia. First, court presidents are the most powerful actors in the Central
and Eastern European judiciaries, irrespective of which model of court
administration is in place. Several earlier studies have shown that court
presidents had a major role in the post-communist countries, establishing a
strong judicial council, an autonomous body composed primarily of judges which
was vested with the power to decide on most aspects of a judge’s career.103
According to Piana, court presidents play a significant role in holding judges to
account in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania104 (which all adopted the
judicial council model) as, aside from their de jure powers, they are ‘endowed with
cognitive resources (information about the situation of the court, information
about the local social system with which the courts interact), but also with political
resources (leadership within the court, prestige, eventually acknowledgement from
the academy or the other legal actors)’.105 A similar pattern has been reported in
101Note that this is a significantly different ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ than in the
context of divorce (see R. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce’, 88 Yale Law Journal (1979) p. 950) or pre-trial bargaining more generally (see
R. Cooter et al., ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior’,
11 Journal of Legal Studies (1982) p. 225), where the metaphor was originally used.
102See supra nn. 86-87.
103For further details of the rise of this pan-European model of judicial council see supra nn. 1-5.
104D. Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe: From Rule of Law to Quality of Justice (Ashgate
2010), p. 43–44.
105Piana, supra n. 104, p. 44.
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Slovakia106 and Croatia,107 which both have strong judicial councils. Court
presidents in all of these countries aptly used these cognitive and political resources
to gain control over the newly-established judicial councils. This has happened
either directly, when court presidents themselves became the members of the
judicial council, or indirectly, when they promoted their protégés. In some
countries, for instance Slovakia between 2009 and 2014, the Supreme Court
President and his allies managed to capture the judicial council completely,
exercising almost unlimited control over the entire Slovak judiciary.108 In other
words, while judicial councils in Central and Eastern Europe disempowered the
Ministers of Justice and the legislatures, rather than empowering regular judges,
they increased the power of court presidents.
This case study then attests109 that, contrary to general wisdom, court presidents
may enjoy significant powers even within the Ministry of Justice model of court
administration. Czech statutory law granted a major say regarding most mechanisms
of judicial accountability to the Minister of Justice, yet the court presidents eroded
the Minister’s sphere of influence step-by-step while broadening their own powers.
Information asymmetry and hasty legislation in the early 1990s left many gaps in
statutory law. This gave court presidents room in which to manoeuvre, and they fully
exploited that opportunity. When losing ground in confrontation with the Minister
of Justice, their ultimate strategy was to appeal to the public at large, to the
administrative courts or to the Constitutional Court, raising the flag of judicial
independence.110 They not only managed to preserve their powers, but also managed
to emancipate themselves from the Minister of Justice.
These findings challenge earlier claims that Czech court presidents have little
power.111 Contrary to claims in the literature, Czech court presidents have a major
say in the mechanisms of institutional and managerial accountability.112 They
control the assignment and reassignment of judges between chambers, case
assignment, and the appointment of chamber presidents, and initiate the majority
of disciplinary motions against judges.113 In addition, they process complaints
106See e.g. Bobek, supra n. 8, p. 253–254; and Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 236-333.
107See e.g. A. Uzelac, ‘Role and Status of Judges in Croatia’, in P. Oberhammer (ed.), Richterbild
und Rechtsreform in Mitteleuropa (Manzsche Verlags 2001) p. 23 at p. 43-57.
108See infra nn. 126-130; and Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 317-329 and 355-361.
109The Slovak case study in the period before the introduction of the Slovak Judicial Council yields
similar results. See Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 264-299 and 334-339.
110See the previous two sections of this article.
111Piana, supra n. 4, p. 43-44 (Table 1.8).
112At the same time, Piana overestimates the power of judicial boards and court managers that are
in fact marginal players in Czech judicial politics. They are either advisory bodies to court presidents
(judicial boards) or their subordinates (court managers) and thus they are far less influential.
113Of the 246 disciplinary motions lodged from 2003 to 2010 court presidents initiated
213 (87%); see Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 227.
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from court users and de facto decide, jointly with the Minister of Justice,
on the appointment, promotion and secondment of judges. Therefore,
Czech court presidents have de facto similar powers to their counterparts in
Poland and Hungary, even though the former operate within the Ministry
of Justice model of court administration whereas the latter two work
within the judicial council model.114 In sum, court presidents are the masters of
Central and Eastern European judiciaries, irrespective of the model of court
administration.115
The Czech development thus shows that court presidents may de facto fulfil the
tasks of the judicial council in preserving the independence of the judiciary from
the other political branches and that the post-communist judiciary can achieve a
significant judicial autonomy even without a judicial council. Identifying the
circumstances under which this may happen remains a vexing question for many
post-Soviet republics. The Czech case study suggests that the following conditions
induce the emancipation of court presidents: a vigilant constitutional court that is
easily accessible to court presidents, a high turnover of Ministers of Justice, relative
unity among court presidents, strong information asymmetry working in favour of
court presidents, and a competitive political regime with fragile majorities in the
parliament. However, it is necessary to test these criteria on other case studies to
see whether they are necessary and sufficient conditions.
The second insight follows naturally from the first. Once we acknowledge that
court presidents have broad powers vis-à-vis regular judges, and that they can
misuse those powers, the next step is to provide mechanisms to protect regular
judges against the arbitrary actions of court presidents. This means that we should
approach both the external and internal accountability of judges with the same
level of caution.116 While some documents dealing with judicial independence
and judicial councils acknowledge that improper pressure on a judge can stem
from within the judiciary,117 they take for granted that internal pressure is
somehow less dangerous. Recent scholarship also proceeds from the assumption
114For a similar conclusion see Z. Kühn, ‘The Democratization and Modernization of Post-
Communist Judiciaries’, in A. Febbrajo and W. Sadurski (eds.), Central and Eastern Europe After
Transition (Ashgate Publishing 2010) p. 177 at p. 190.
115This also explains why so many cases regarding the dismissal of court presidents reach the
Strasbourg Court. See e.g. ECtHR 5 February 2009, Case No. 22330/05 Olujić v Croatia; ECtHR
21 January 2016, Case No. 29908/11 Ivanovski v FYROM; and ECtHR 23 June 2016, Case No.
[GC] 20261/12, Baka v Hungary.
116On this distinction see Part IV (External Controls) and Part V (Internal Controls) in G. Canivet
et al. (eds.), Independence, Accountability and the Judiciary (British Institute of International and
Comparative Law 2006).
117See e.g. European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, ‘Independence and Accountability of
the Judiciary’, ENCJ Report, 2013-2014, p. 17.
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that independence from politicians is at the heart of the normative importance of
independent courts to the rule of law.118
This article challenges this view and argues that internal pressure can be as
dangerous as direct pressure from politicians.119 The Czech court presidents decide
on the general rules of case assignment,120 may reassign cases on vague criteria such as
the ‘even distribution of caseload’,121 may reallocate judges of their courts to another
court section,122 may unilaterally promote judges to the position of chamber
president,123 and may deny the promotion of a judge to a higher court.124
The exercise of this power often goes unchecked, and thus some court presidents
may abuse it. For instance, when a judge of the district court in Prague resisted her
reassignment from a civil law to a criminal law chamber in the early 1990s, the court
president immediately initiated a disciplinary motion against her and the disciplinary
panel mercilessly imposed the harshest sentence – dismissal from judicial office – for
violation of judicial duty.125 This pattern persists. In 2011 a judge of the regional
court who had specialised in civil and corporate law for 20 years was transferred
without his consent to the criminal law section by the court president. This judge
challenged his reallocation before the administrative courts, but lost. The Supreme
Administrative Court eventually found the issue non-justiciable and thus de facto
upheld the unlimited discretion of the court presidents.126 Similarly, when one judge
of the high court openly criticised the promotion of what he argued was a
sub-standard regional court judge to the high court in 2013, the president of the high
court transferred this ‘recalcitrant’ judge outside his specialisation from the
118See e.g. Popova, supra n. 72.
119Note that politicians may also use court presidents as their ‘transmission belts’ and exercise their
influence over individual judges indirectly (see supra n. 28 and nn. 53-62). The most recent
scholarship even suggests that clientelistic rulers may intentionally transfer significant powers over
individual courts and the rest of the judiciary to the loyal court presidents in exchange for favourable
rulings (see R. Ellett et al., ‘Chief Justice as a Political Agent: Evidence from Zambia, Venezuela, and
Ukraine’, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference in Prague on 9 September 2016 (on file
with author)).
120This has started to change only in 2016 due to the new case law of the Czech Constitutional
Court (see Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 15 June 2016, case no. I. ÚS 2769/15).
121The power of court presidents to reassign cases has also been limited only recently due
the new case law of the Czech Constitutional Court (see ibid.).
122This power of court presidents was recently confirmed by the Czech Supreme Administrative
Court. See infra n. 126.
123Promotion to the position of chamber president not only increases the reputation of a given
Czech judge, it also comes with a significant salary rise.
124This power of court presidents was confirmed by the Czech Constitutional Court in the
Brožová cases (see in particular supra nn. 67-68).
125Decision of the High Court of Prague of 29 June 1994 Judge S. W.
126 Judgment of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court of 19 September 2012, No 1 As 48/
2012-28.
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commercial section of the high court to the insolvency section.127 The reassigned
judge again had nomeans of challenging this reprisal. The Czech court presidents can
also postpone or even deny the promotion of judges to the position of chamber
president. Regular judges again have no chance of challenging this and thus their
promotion is fully dependent on the court president.
The situation got even worse in Slovakia, which had adopted the judicial council
model, after the election of Štefan Harabin to the position of President of the Slovak
Supreme Court in 2009. Soon after he became the Supreme Court president,
Harabin started to settle the score with his critics at the Supreme Court. He bought
the support of his allies at the Supreme Court with huge salary bonuses while at the
same time denying bonuses to the Supreme Court judges who were critical of him.128
One of the Supreme Court judges, Peter Paluda, who was on Harabin’s ‘black list’
expressed it clearly: ‘Harabin produces loyal judges by threatening them and at the
same time by pleasing them with salary bonuses and allowing them to function
normally if they are obedient’.129 He also increased the case loads of his critics and
reassigned them to panels outside their area of expertise,130 and initiated disciplinary
motions against his opponents at the Supreme Court.131 Last but not least,
‘recalcitrant’ judges faced further reprisals that are difficult to quantify, such as poor
working conditions, slow computers or denial of reimbursement for attending
judicial training.132 Some of these techniques, such as selective case assignment and
reassignment, have permeated other judiciaries in the region too.133
127Email from a judge of the High Court of Prague of 26 September 2015 (on file with author).
128See L. Kostelanský and V. Vavrová, ‘Harabinovi sudcovia zarobili viac ako premiér’, Pravda, 12
August 2010; E. Mihočková, ‘Šikanovanie v talári’, Plus 7 dní, 12 December 2011, <www.pluska.
sk/plus7dni/vsimli-sme-si/sikanovanie-vtalari.html>, visited 14 December 2016; and K. Staroňová,
‘Rovní a rovnejší Štefana Harabina’, Trend.sk, 1 June 2009, <blog.etrend.sk/sgi-blog/rovni-a-
rovnejsi-stefana-harabina.html>, visited 14 December 2016.
129Mihočková, supra n. 126. See also P. Kubík and F. Múčka, ‘Ako úraduje Štefan I.
Čistič: Pôsobenie nového šéfa Najvyššieho súdu SR varuje pred rozširovaním jeho kompetencií’,
Trend, 30 September 2009, <ekonomika.etrend.sk/ekonomika-slovensko/ako-uraduje-stefan-i-
cistic-2.html>, visited 14 December 2016; and P. Kubík, ‘Keď losuje Štefan Harabin: Na
Najvyššom súde majú rozhodnutia predsedu občas väčšiu váhu ako paragrafy’, Trend, 11 March
2010, <ekonomika.etrend.sk/ekonomika-slovensko/ked-losuje-stefan-harabin-2.html>, visited 14
December 2016.
130 Ibid.
131Harabin himself initiated 12 disciplinary motions against Supreme Court judges in 2009 and
2010 and one more motion was triggered by the JCSR, which was chaired by Harabin (some of these
cases are reported in L. Bojarski and W. Stemker Köster, The Slovak Judiciary: Its Current State and
Challenges (Open Society Fund 2011) p. 102–105). See also Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 319-320.
132See Mihočková, supra n. 126.
133See e.g. ECtHR 10 October 2000, Case No. 42095/98, Daktaras v Lithuania §§ 35-38;
ECtHR 3May 2007, Case No. 7577/02 Bochan vUkraine § 74; ECtHR 9October 2008, Case No.
62936/00, Moiseyev v Russia §§ 182-184; ECtHR 5 October 2010, Case No. 19334/03, DMD
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As a result, it is critical to erect safeguards of internal independence that shield
individual judges from the improper influence of court presidents. Due to existing
abuses involving the distribution of cases in Central and Eastern European
countries, cases should be assigned on a strictly random basis. Regular judges
should also be allowed to challenge irregularities in the initial case assignment as
well as subsequent reassignment either before administrative courts134 or before a
special administrative body, where court presidents do not have a majority.135
Similarly, reassignment of a judge outside his specialisation is not merely a
‘managerial decision’ of a court president,136 as it may interfere with individual
judicial independence.137 This means that such decisions should be subject to the
consent of another body, such as judicial boards in the Czech context, and the
transferred judge should be given extra time to become acquainted with the new
area of law.138 Finally, salary bonuses should be prohibited in order to avoid their
misuse. Most of these measures will come at a price, but the independence of
individual judges should prevail over the managerial aspects of judging, such as
the efficiency and speed of justice.
More recently, even the European Court of Human Rights has started to
acknowledge the importance of internal independence.139 For instance, in Gazeta
Ukraina-Tsentr v Ukraine a local journalist criticised Mr Y, the Chairman of the
Kirovograd Regional Council of Judges. Mr Y subsequently lodged a civil claim for
defamation and won before the courts of Kirovograd Region. The Strasbourg
Court acknowledged the importance of the internal independence of judges and
eventually found a violation of the right to a fair trial, because the material
submitted by the applicant company demonstrated the possible risk that all judges
in the Kirovograd region would be influenced by the threat of disciplinary
proceedings or other career-related decisions by Mr Y.140 In Agrokompleks v
Ukraine, the president of the Higher Arbitration Court had given direct
instructions to his deputies to reconsider the earlier court’s ruling.
GROUP, a.s. v Slovakia §§ 65-71; ECtHR 3May 2011, No. 30024/02, Sutyagin v Russia § 190; and
ECtHR 12 January 2016, Case No. 57774/13, Miracle Europe Kft v Hungary §§ 53-63.
134Such a model operates, for instance, in Germany.
135Such a model operates, for instance, in Austria.
136This is a position commonly held by Czech court presidents.
137Even though rank-and-file judges are often reassigned not for their judicial decision-making,
but for their criticism of the current model of court administration or for criticising court presidents
and their actions.
138This is exactly what the Slovak centrist government did in 2011 to prevent further misuse of
powers by court presidents in Slovakia. See Art. 51a(2) of the Slovak Law No. 757/2004 Coll., on
Judges (which introduced a two-month period for reassigned judges to get acquainted with the new
area of law).
139See also cases cited in supra n. 133.
140ECtHR 15 July 2010, Case No. 16695/04, Gazeta Ukraina-Tsentr v Ukraine §§ 33-34.
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The Strasbourg Court again found these acts of the court president contrary to the
principle of internal judicial independence.141 In another line of case law the
European Court of Human Rights found the abuse of case assignment powers by
court presidents in violation of the right to fair trial, because it made rank-and-file
judges dependent on the will of court presidents.142
However, these cases are just the tip of the iceberg. More should be
done at the institutional level. This brings us to the third insight. There
has been too much emphasis placed on the independence of the judiciary recently,
both in scholarly literature and in policy documents, whereas the independence
of individual judges has been rather neglected. What is worse, sometimes the
independence of the judiciary and the independence of individual judges have
been conflated. This article suggests that it is high time for the pendulum to swing
back, allowing us to refocus our attention on the independence of individual
judges. That is what Germany did after the SecondWorldWar and the investment
paid off.143
We should thus accept that the independence of the judiciary and the
independence of individual judges are separate matters, and that increasing
the former does not automatically improve the latter.144 The Czech case study and
the literature on other Central and Eastern European countries suggest that threats
to the independence of judges coming from within the judiciary can be as
dangerous as external threats. To make things worse, these threats coming from
the court presidents are less politically salient than the actions of the Minister of
Justice and are often excluded from judicial review.145 Hence, if one wants to
increase the independence of individual judges in Czechia, it will be necessary to
reduce146 or at least diffuse147 the powers of court presidents. The same logic
141ECtHR 6 October 2011, Case No. 23465/03, Agrokompleks v Ukraine §§ 137-139. See also
ECtHR 9 January 2013, Case No. 21722/11, Volkov v Ukraine.
142See the cases mentioned in supra n. 133.
143See e.g. A. Seibert-Fohr, ‘Judicial Independence in Germany’, in A. Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial
Independence in Transition (Springer 2012) p. 447 at p. 481-483; and J. Riedel, ‘Recruitment,
Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Germany’, in G. Federico (ed.),
Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Europe (IRSIG-CNR
2005) p. 69 at p. 98-107.
144See also C. Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Europe: Threat or Resource for Democracy?’,
49 Representation (2013) p. 347 at p. 353.
145See e.g. supra n. 126.
146One option for reducing the powers of court presidents would be to adopt strictly random case
assignment or to promote judges to the position of chamber president on the basis of seniority.
147One way to diffuse the powers of court presidents is to require the consent of judicial boards for
certain actions of court presidents, such as the reassignment of judges, the reassignment of cases, or
the promotion of judges to the position of chamber president.
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applies to the Central and Eastern European countries148 that transferred most
of the powers regarding individual judges’ careers to the judicial council.149
This need to distinguish judicial autonomy from the independence of
individual judges is equally relevant beyond the post-communist countries. For
instance, many judges in the United Kingdom interviewed in a recent book on
British judicial politics suggest that greater formal judicial autonomy after the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 could lead, paradoxically, to a loss of
protection of judges’ independence, because a new, more arms-length, Lord
Chancellor in the executive will no longer serve as the protector of judicial
independence from within the executive branch.150 The Swedish judiciary serves
as another counter-example arguing against the widely-held belief that there is a
correlation between judicial autonomy and individual judicial independence,
since Swedish judges enjoy significant protection, even though Sweden has never
been characterised by particularly strong institutional independence.151
Finally, enhancing the independence of individual judges has one more
advantage. It is more resistant to abusive constitutionalism, which has recently
surged in Hungary and Poland.152 In fact, both Orbán and Kaczyński have used
similar techniques against the judiciary and, most importantly from the
perspective of this article, both have tried to turn court presidents into their
‘transmission belts’153 who would subsequently exercise influence over individual
judges. Orbán expanded the size of the Constitutional Court and then packed
it,154 ensuring that he could install a new president of the Constitutional
Court,155 ousted the Supreme Court president through a constitutional
amendment,156 created the new institution with power over ordinary judicial
appointments,157 and reduced the maximum retirement age of judges, which led
148See supra n. 5.
149See Popova, supra n. 5 (regarding Bulgaria); and Kosař, supra n. 5, p. 409-411 (regarding
Slovakia).
150See G. Gee et al., The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution
(Cambridge 2015) p. 50-55.
151See J. Nergelius, and D. Zimmermann, ‘Judicial independence in Sweden’, in A. Seibert-Fohr
(ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition (Springer 2012) p. 185–229.
152See D. Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’, 47 University of California Davis Law Review
(2013) p. 189 at p. 208-211; M. Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, 100 Cornell Law
Review (2015) p. 391 at p. 433-435; and G. Halmai, ‘From the “Rule of Law Revolution” to the
Constitutional Counter-Revolution in Hungary’, in W. Bedenek et al. (eds.), European Yearbook
of Human Rights (2012) p. 367.
153See supra n. 28 and nn. 53-62.
154See Halmai, supra n. 150, p. 379; and Landau, supra n. 150, p. 209.
155See Halmai, supra n. 150, p. 379.
156See ECtHR 23 June 2016, Case [GC] No. 20261/12, Baka v Hungary.
157See Landau, supra n. 150, p. 209-210.
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to the de facto dismissal of 20 of the 74 judges of the Supreme Court158 and several
court presidents at the lower courts.159 Kaczyński followed the same rule book. He
has attempted to pack the Constitutional Tribunal and reduce the term of the
current Constitutional Tribunal president, tinkered with the composition of the
Polish judicial council and exercised significant pressure on the court
presidents.160 Most scholars have focused primarily on changes that affect the
constitutional courts, but the key to the long-term control of the judiciary is held
by the presidents of ordinary courts and judicial councils. In other words, since
court presidents and judicial councils exercise wide powers over individual judges,
all that Orbán and Kaczyński need to do is to install their own court presidents,
pack the judicial council, and turn both into ‘transmission belts’. Conversely,
by empowering individual judges against court presidents and judicial councils,
and by setting up barriers to protect regular judges, it would have been
significantly more difficult for Orbán and Kaczyński to gain control over the
judiciary. It is perhaps too late to erect these barriers in Poland and Hungary, but it
might still work in other Central and Eastern European countries.
Conclusion
This article focused on Czechia, which is the proverbial ‘black sheep’ among
Central and Eastern European countries as regards judicial reform. It has not
buckled under the pressure of the European Union and the Council of Europe and
has not established a judicial council. The Czech case study shows that, contrary to
general wisdom, court presidents became powerful actors and managed to achieve
significant judicial autonomy even without the implementation of a judicial
council. This has led to bargaining between the Minister of Justice and court
158T. Gyulavári and N. Hős, ‘Retirement of Hungarian Judges, Age Discrimination and Judicial
Independence: A Tale of Two Courts’, 42 Industrial Law Journal (2013) p. 289 at p. 290. See also
U. Belavusau, ‘On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead Dogs: Commission v. Hungary’, 50 CMLR
(2013) p. 1145.
159 In fact, court presidents were the main target of this move. I am grateful to Gábor Halmai for
this insight.
160See e.g. A. Radwan, ‘Chess-boxing around the Rule of Law: Polish Constitutionalism at
Trial’, VerfBlog, 23 December 2015, <verfassungsblog.de/chess-boxing-around-the-rule-of-law-polish-
constitutionalism-at-trial/>, visited 14 December 2016; A. Śledzińska-Simon, ‘Paradoxes of
Constitutionalisation: Lessons from Poland’, VerfBlog, 30 March 2016, <verfassungsblog.de/paradoxes-
of-constitutionalisation-lessons-from-poland>, visited 14 December 2016; and W. Zuzek, ‘The National
Council of the Judiciary is under attack in different ways’, VerfBlog, 11 October 2016, <verfassungsblog.
de/the-national-council-of-the-judiciary-is-under-attack-in-different-ways/>, visited 14 December 2016.
See also T. Koncewicz, ‘Of institutions, democracy, constitutional self-defence and the rule of law: The
judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Cases K 34/15, K 35/15 and beyond’, 53 CMLR
(2016) p. 1753.
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presidents in the shadow of the law, and struck a particularly fragile balance
between them. At the same time, some court presidents have abused their
newly-accrued powers by bringing them to bear against rank-and-file judges,
which in turn makes those rank-and-file judges dependent on court presidents.
This development calls for rethinking the current understanding of judicial
accountability and judicial independence, which requires acknowledging the wide
powers of the court presidents, treating the internal independence of judges as
being of equal importance as external independence from the actors outside the
judiciary, and placing greater emphasis on the independence of individual judges
rather than on the independence of the judiciary as a whole. What matters most is,
ultimately, the independence of individual judges.
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